Introduction
We are interested in the formalization of monotonic belief and belief about belief in a multiagent environment. Here, we restrict ourselves to the propositional case. We distinguish between ideal beliefs and real beliefs. Intuitively, the former are those beliefs which satisfy certain \idealized" properties which ? The authors would like to thank Massimo Benerecetti, Alessandro Cimatti and Luciano Sera ni for many fruitful discussions on issues related to the subject of this paper. Some parts of this article appear also in a paper with the same title presented at the International Conference on Formal and Applied Practical Reasoning (FAPR), Bonn (Germany), 3-7 June 1996. are unlikely to be possessed by real agents. The standard example of idealized property is the closure over modus ponens, that is, the ability of an agent to believe all the consequences of its beliefs. Dually, by real beliefs, we mean those beliefs which do not satisfy certain chosen properties, e.g., the above mentioned closure over modus ponens.
A lot of work can be found in the literature about these issues. Most of this work is based on the use of modal logics, and notions similar to those of ideal and real belief are formalized in the notions of logical omniscience and non logical omniscience, respectively (see, e.g., 9] for an excellent presentation of these ideas). We di er from the previous work in two major respects.
The rst is the formalism. We use the multicontext formalism originally introduced in 12] and then further developed in 15] . These systems allow us to model an agent as a set of \interacting" distinct theories. The intuition is that each theory models a point of view that the agent has (about its own beliefs, about the beliefs of another agent, about the beliefs about the beliefs of another agent, : : :and so on); while the \interaction" among theories 1 models the fact that what is true in a view is usually compatible with what is true in another view. The major feature of this approach is that it allows for an incremental and modular speci cation of multiagent systems. One can specify the beliefs of an agent, the beliefs he has about other agents, : : :and so on, one by one, as distinct theories, and then impose the relations which exist between these theories. A multiagent system is speci ed from the inside. This feature is crucial in the modeling of complex situations where there is no (or it is hard to de ne a) global scheme describing the overall application. 2 The second is our characterization of ideal and real belief (as opposed to that of omniscience and non omniscience). We propose a two-step characterization:
(i) First, we give a set-theoretic speci cation of beliefs (beliefs about beliefs).
The intuition is that a set of beliefs (beliefs about beliefs) is ideal only if it satis es certain closure conditions. These closure conditions formalize the idealized properties mentioned above. (ii) Then, following what is standard practice in software speci cation, we 1 This notion will be made precise below. 2 As a matter of fact, our proposed framework formalizes ideas which have been exploited in many complex applications developed in various areas of Arti cial Intelligence, e.g., computational linguistics 7, 27, 28] , the formalization of opacity and transparency in belief contexts 1], the integration of information coming from heterogeneous data bases 24], planning 20], and multiagent systems 17, 19, 26, 4, 5] . For the sake of completeness, it must also be said that our approach shares some intuitions with Konolige's semantics for modal logics 18] . The substantial di erence, as it will be clear from the following, is that here the agents' theories are de ned in the proof theory.
de ne the appropriate constructors which present such sets of ideal beliefs (beliefs about beliefs). Finally, the possible sources of reality can be taxonomically characterized by looking at the possible ways in which the constructors for ideality can \go wrong".
The set-theoretic characterization we propose exploits in a substantial way the rich structure (i.e., the multiple theories and their compatibility relations) provided by the formalism. It is important to notice that, even though ideality/reality and (non) logical omniscience capture similar intuitions (as also shown by the equivalence results given below in Section 5), there are some important di erences. For instance, as discussed in detail below, reality does not coincide with not ideality, and ideality is a more granular and weaker notion than the notion of omniscience captured in the standard approach (e.g., by the modal system K). Furthermore, (non) omniscience has often (mainly?) been characterized model-theoretically, and, as far as we know, never settheoretically or proof-theoretically. We believe that the taxonomic analysis provided below would be very hard to do, if not impossible, by using modeltheoretic notions. Incompleteness or incorrectness arise because of a failure in the reasoning mechanisms. For instance, an agent may not be aware of some inference rules, or not be able to iterate the reasoning process beyond a certain limit. A semantic characterization, instead, is based on the notions of interpretation and model. Interpretations are given inductively following the structure of formulas, and are independent of how theories are de ned and used and, therefore, of how the reasoning is done. It is not clear how to provide a uniform map from failures in the reasoning into appropriate truth conditions given on the structure of formulas. 3 The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we specify beliefs and beliefs about beliefs as certain sets of formulas constituent the notions of reasoner and observer, respectively. In this section we also show how beliefs and beliefs about beliefs can be presented as certain kinds of multicontext systems. In Section 3 we de ne the multicontext systems for ideal belief and ideal belief about belief, MBK ? . In Section 4 we characterize the possible forms of reality by analyzing how the constructors for ideal belief and ideal belief about belief can be modi ed to generate incompleteness, incorrectness, or a combination of them. The tricky part is in the de nitions of incompleteness and incorrectness. In Section 5 we compare MBK ? and some multicontext systems for real belief with some important modal systems. The goal of this analysis is to provide intuitions about the expressive power and conceptual importance of the multicontext systems de ned. Till Section 5 we limit ourselves to the case of only two reasoners. This is a very strong hypothesis which, among other things, forces us to deal only with the case of no nested beliefs. In Section 6 we show how the de nitions and methodology given in the previous sections can be uniformly lifted to account for arbitrary sets of reasoners. As a particular important case, in Section 7 we show how multiple reasoners can be put together to generate nested beliefs, and discuss how the equivalence theorems presented in Section 5 can be generalized to this situation. We give some concluding remarks in Section 8. To make the paper easier to read, we instantiate the approach and the technical notions introduced to a running example which is developed all along the paper. The example is adapted from Chapter 10 of Raymond Smullyan's \Alice in Puzzleland" 25] and goes as follows.
Example 1 Consider the scene represented in Figure 1 . Two agents {Alice (left) and Humpty Dumpty (right){ are thinking about the beliefs of a third agent {the White Knight. The White Knight is a \looking glass logician", namely he only believes false beliefs. Furthermore, he believes the negation of the formulas which follow from the negation of his (false) beliefs. In particular the White Knight believes all the contradictory sentences. Alice and Humpty Dumpty have di erent beliefs, di erent views of the beliefs of the other, di erent views of the beliefs of the White Knight, : : : and so on. Humpty Dumpty is a \keen arguer" while Alice is not; she has limited capabilities both in reasoning and in having beliefs about beliefs. Furthermore, Humpty Dumpty knows that the White Knight is a looking glass logician while Alice does not; she ascribes to the White Knight reasoning capabilities similar to hers.
Reasoners and observers
As mentioned in the introduction, an agent is formalized as a set of \inter-acting" theories. Let us see how this vague statement can be instantiated to Example 1.
Example 2 Consider the beliefs of Alice, as shown in Figure 1 . Their formalization requires only two theories, namely: { a theory formalizing Alice's view of the world (that is, Alice's beliefs): her rst and fourth belief belong to this theory; and { a theory, formalizing Alice's view of the White Knight view of the world, which contains her second and third belief.
Analogously for Humpty Dumpty we have:
{ a theory formalizing Humpty Dumpty's view of the world: his rst and fourth belief belong to this theory; and { a theory, formalizing Humpty Dumpty's view about the White Knight view of the world, which contains his second and third belief. Arrows intuitively represent the (compatibility) relation which exists between the connected theories. In this example the relation is that \of the source theory having beliefs about the target theory".
Notice that in Figure 2 we have only two theories per agent. Knight has about some other agent A i would require a third theory. In this case, the schema of Figure 2 would have to be modi ed by adding a theory R A;W;A i and an arrow from R A;W to R A;W;A i .
Even if very simple, Example 1 and its formalization in Example 2, suggest the two basic means by which new beliefs can be inferred inside a view:
(i) By reasoning inside the theory formalizing the view. Thus, for instance, in Figure 1 (left), the third belief is derived from the second by applying a conjunction elimination. To emphasize this fact we call a theory formalizing a view, a reasoner. (ii) By inferring beliefs from the fact that another reasoner has a belief. Thus, for instance, in Figure 1 (left), the fourth belief (belonging to R A ) is derived from the fact that the third belief belongs to R A;W . We call observer a reasoner which is capable of having beliefs about the beliefs of another reasoner. In Figure 2 the observers are the reasoners which are the source of an arrow.
We abstractly represent the reasoning capabilities of a reasoner R as a pair hL;Ti, where L is a set of rst order sentences and T L. L is the language and T is the set of beliefs or theorems of R. (Notationally, in the following, R i stands for the pair hL i ; T i i.) In this paper we restrict ourselves to the propositional case; formulas are thus propositional combinations of either propositional letters or expressions of the form B(\A"), where A is a propositional formula. The latter formulas are called belief sentences. A in B(\A") is called the argument of B.
To represent abstractly the interaction capabilities of a reasoner we need two reasoners, one having beliefs, the other having beliefs about the rst. This is captured by the notion of belief system.
De nition 3 (Belief System) Let B be a unary predicate symbol. A belief system (for B) is a pair of reasoners hR 0 ; R 1 i B . The parameter B is the belief predicate, R 0 is the observer and R 1 is the observed reasoner of hR 0 ; R 1 i B .
R 0 's beliefs about R 1 's beliefs are represented by the set of belief sentences which are part of the beliefs of R 0 . { the set of belief sentences in L A corresponds to some given subset ? of L A;W , i.e., it is the set fB(\A") j A 2 ?; ? L A;W g; and { given the same set ? as above, the set of belief sentences in T A is fB(\A") j A 2 T A;W \ ?g:
The rst two items re ect the fact that Alice has limited reasoning capabilities, and the assumption that Alice ascribes to the White Knight reasoning capabilities similar to hers. The last two items re ect the fact that Alice has limited capabilities in having beliefs about her beliefs.
As we will see in Example 7, the above conditions allow us to formalize Humpty Dumpty' and Alice's reasoning in Figure 1 .
Presenting a belief system requires representing the reasoning and interaction capabilities of each reasoner in the belief system. The reasoning capabilities of a reasoner can be represented by some set of facts (its basic beliefs) together with some inference engine which allows it to derive beliefs from the beliefs it already has. For each reasoner R i , we thus introduce a corresponding context C i , de ned as an axiomatic formal system, i.e., a triple hL i ; i ; i i, where L i is the language, i is the set of axioms and i is the set of inference rules of C i . (Notationally, in the following, a context C i is implicitly de ned as hL i ; i ; i i.) The interaction capabilities of a reasoner can be represented by some set of bridge rules, i.e., inference rules with premises and conclusions in di erent contexts. For instance, the bridge rule C 1 :A 1 C 2 :A 2 allows us to derive the formula A 2 in context C 2 just because the formula A 1 has been derived in context C 1 . (Notationally, we write C : A to mean the formula A in the context C.) Contexts and bridge rules are the components of multicontext systems (MC systems), where an MC system is de ned as a pair hfamily-of-contexts, set-of-bridge-rulesi. 4 Derivability in a MC system MS, in symbols`M S , is de ned in 12]. For sake of completeness this de nition is reported in Appendix A. Appendix A contains also a detailed description of the notation used for representing contextual inference rules and bridge rules. Roughly speaking, derivability in a MC system is a generalization of Prawitz' notion of deduction inside a Natural Deduction System 23] obtained by allowing multiple languages (one per context) and by indexing formulas with the context they belong to. 4 Multicontext systems can be thought of as particular Labelled Deductive Systems (LDS)s 10,11]. In particular, multicontext systems are LDSs where labels are used only to keep track of the context formulas belong to, and where inference rules can be applied only to formulas belonging to the \appropriate" context.
We are interested in interactions between R 0 and R 1 which enable R 0 to derive B(\A") when R 0 derives A and/or viceversa. The particular class of MC systems presenting belief systems can therefore be characterized as follows: The intuition is that R 0 and R 1 are ideal reasoners if they are able to believe all and only the (tautological) consequences of what they know. R 0 is an ideal observer if it believes all and only those belief sentences whose argument is a belief of R 1 . Notice that no request is made about the speci c elements of the sets de ning an ideal reasoner or an ideal observer. Thus, for instance, whether a formula belongs to the set of beliefs of an ideal reasoner is left undetermined; we only require that, if this is the case, so must be for all its consequences. This choice re ects how, in practice, ideality is dealt with in the literature where, for instance, K is the modal system for omniscience no matter what theoretic axioms are added.
Notice that the \empty" reasoner | the reasoner with empty language | is ideal. Analogously, any \absolutely contradictory" reasoner | any reasoner with a full propositional language L believing any proposition in L | is ideal. At a rst sight this might go against our intuitions. However it is a fact that these reasoners satisfy all the conditions for ideality. A good way to think about this is to see these reasoners as the result of a process of limit where we progressively decrease the number of atomic formulas of a language (in the case of empty reasoner) or increase the number of theorems (in the case of absolutely contradictory reasoners). The proof is straightforward. It is su cient to observe that the rst two conditions in De nition 10 ensure that each R i is an ideal reasoner (i = 0; 1); while the last two ensure that R 0 is an ideal observer.
Real reasoners and observers
At rst, one is tempted to de ne reality as not ideality, in the same way as not omniscience is usually de ned as absence of omniscience. However this is not what we want. Consider for instance the empty reasoner and any absolutely contradictory reasoner. These are ideal reasoners, nevertheless we would like to say that they are also real. There is in fact a sense in which the empty reasoner believes \too little" while any absolutely contradictory reasoner believes \too much" with respect to what we would consider an ideal situation. Analogously, consider a reasoner which is not aware of a proposition or does not believe a true sentence, but whose formation and inference rules are complete for propositional logic. This reasoner is an ideal reasoner, however we would like 6 We also use standard abbreviations from propositional logic, such as :A for A ?, A _ B for :A B, A^B for :(:A _ :B), > for ? ?. 7 Notice that RPL 1 is a derived inference rule of RPL 2 , and thus both 0 and 1 are not minimal. However, the case k = 1 allows for a more natural formulation of
De nition 28 in Section 5.2.
to say that it is also a real reasoner. This reasoner simply does not know all it ought to know.
Di erently from what is the case for ideality, reality is a relative notion which states the absence of certain properties with respect to a speci c reference. When talking of a real reasoner or a real observer we mean that such a reasoner or observer believes too little or too much (i.e., it is incomplete or incorrect) with respect to a reasoner or observer taken as reference. This intuition is already informally articulated, even if limited to beliefs and reasoners, in 16].
In particular, in that paper a reasoner is de ned real relatively to another reasoner, independently of (what we have called here) the belief system of which it is part. However, the formalization of these ideas is more complex than it might seem, and, as the technical development discussed below shows, the notion of reality informally introduced in 16] is not correct. The key observation is that two reasoners or observers cannot be compared independently of the belief system of which they are part.
The proofs of the theorems in this Section are reported in Appendix B.
Realizing MR ? systems
The starting point is to de ne when a belief system is (in)correct or (in)complete with respect to another belief system (notationally, we write hR A 0 ; R The intuition is that, for instance, in a correct belief system, each reasoner maintains a subset of the beliefs of the corresponding reasoner in the reference belief system. If the beliefs of one reasoner (for example of R E 0 ) are strictly contained in the beliefs of the corresponding reasoner (R I 0 ) then the belief system is incomplete. We say that hR E 0 ; R E 1 i B is real with respect to hR I 0 ; R I 1 i B , to mean that hR E 0 ; R E 1 i B is incomplete or incorrect with respect to hR I 0 ; R I 1 i B . Analogously, we say that a reasoner (observer) is real when it believes more or less beliefs (beliefs about beliefs) than it should, i.e., when it is incorrect or incomplete with respect to another reasoner (observer) taken as reference.
The next step is to \propagate" the notions of (in)correctness and (in)completeness from belief systems to MR ? systems. However things are complicated as a comparison between MR ? systems based simply on set inclusion of the components does not work. For instance, it is easy to think of two di erent sets of axioms with the same proof-theoretic power. To solve this problem we introduce a new operation such that, if C = hL; ; i and C 0 = hL 0 ; 0 ; 0 i are two contexts, then C C 0 is the context hL L 0 ; MS E ] present the same belief system.
MS E is equivalent to MS I if it is correct and complete with respect to MS I . We talk of realization to emphasize the process by which the constructors of a real belief system real reasoner, real observer] are de ned starting from those of a reference belief system reasoner, observer]. Consider for instance the notion of correct realization. MS E is a correct realization of MS I if adding its proof-theoretic power to that of MS I results into a system which still has the same proof-theoretic power as MS I . From the above de nition, it trivially follows that MS E is a correct realization of MS I if and only if MS I is a complete realization of MS E . As trivial examples, the empty system is a correct realization of any reference system MS I . Any absolutely contradictory system MS is complete with respect to any reference system whose two languages stand in a subset relation with the corresponding languages of MS.
Consider the following two examples in which ? is a given, nite set of propositional formulas. In the above two examples, the observer of the belief system presented by MS E is the same. However, Example 14 and Example 15 model two very di erent situations. In the rst example, we have an ideal reasoner R E 0 ideally interacting with a non ideal reasoner R E 1 . In the second example, both R E 0 and R E 1 are ideal reasoners, but the interaction between the two is not ideal. If we assume that R E 1 formalizes an agent a's beliefs about the world while R E 0 formalize a's beliefs about his beliefs about the world, then in the rst case we think that a is not capable of ideal reasoning about the world, while in the second he is assumed to be not capable of ideally observing its own beliefs.
To save space, from now on, we consider incompleteness only. With some provisos, all the results presented below can be replicated for incorrectness. From De nition 13, correct realizations have the property that the result of adding the components of MS I to MS E de nes an MR ? system which still presents a correct belief system. Intuitively, this property guarantees that correct realizations generate theorems in a way which is consistent with how theorems are generated by the reference MR ? system. Example 20 Consider Example 15. In this case, C E 0 is a complete realization of C I 0 , C E 1 is a complete realization of C I 1 and BR E is an incomplete realization of BR I .
Realizing contexts and bridge rules
Notice that in both examples C E 0 is a complete realization of C I 0 even though the beliefs of R E 0 are strictly contained in the beliefs of R I 0 , i.e., T E 0 T I 0 . This is exactly what one would expect since the reasoning capabilities of R I 0 and R E 0 (modeled by C E 0 and C I 0 respectively) are the same. Section 5.2 provides two substantial examples of incomplete realizations of contexts and bridge rules.
Theorem 21 MS E is an incomplete realization of MS I if and only if at least
one of the following three conditions is satis ed:
{ C E 0 is an incomplete realization of C I 0 ; { C E 1 is an incomplete realization of C I 1 ; { BR E is an incomplete realization of BR I .
Realizing the components of contexts
The next and nal step is to iterate what done in Section 4.2 to the components of contexts. Via Theorem 16 and Theorem 21, this provides necessary and su cient conditions on the presented belief systems.
(Notationally, in the following, if C i is a context, P i and W i are the set of atomic formulas and the set of construction rules for L i , respectively. L i is therefore de ned as the smallest set generated from P i and closed under W i , in symbols L i = Cl(P i ; W i 
hCl ( De nition 22 xes the intuitively correct but formally wrong classi cation provided in 16]. That paper discusses in detail the intuitions underlying this classi cation and provides various examples. As already discussed in 16], the various forms of incompleteness (in the signature, formation rules, axioms, inference rules) model very di erent intuitions. For instance, the incompleteness in the signature models the case in which a reasoner is not aware of some primitive propositions. This is the case, for example, of the Bantu tribesman in 8] who is not aware that personal computer prices are going down. A \more civilized" tribesman might be aware of computers and their prices, but he might not believe that their prices are decreasing. The latter situation is modeled with a reasoner incomplete in the axioms. Incompleteness in the formation rules and/or inference rules are best suited for modeling the limitation of resources that real reasoners have both in constructing sentences and in proving theorems.
Theorem 24 C E i is an incomplete realization of C I i (i = 0; 1) if and only if at least one of the following four conditions is satis ed:
{ P E i is an incomplete realization of P I i ; { W E i is an incomplete realization of W I i ; { E i is an incomplete realization of I i ; { E i is an incomplete realization of I i .
It is important to notice that the classi cation provided by De nitions 18 8 Strictly speaking, hL E j ; W E j ; E j I j ; E j i is not assured to be a context unless I j L E j . More carefully, we should write hL E j ; W E j ; E j ( I j \ L E j ); E j i. Analogously for hL E j ; W E j ; E j ; E j I j i.
A comparison with modal systems
The most common approach to the formalization of the beliefs of an agent a is to take an axiomatic formal system, extend its language with a modal operator B, 9 and (under the objective interpretation of belief 22]) take BA as representing the fact that a believes A. The desired properties of a's beliefs are obtained by considering some set of axioms (each set characterizing a particular modal system , see for example 3, 9] 
where A + is the modal counterpart of A, i.e., it is obtained replacing any monadic atomic formula M(\B") with MB in A.
The proofs of the theorems in this Section are in Appendix C. Notice that in this section, coherently with the analysis given above, we restrict ourselves to the case of no nesting of modal operators (no nested beliefs). This assumption is lifted in Section 7.
Normal modal systems
We start by studying whether the smallest normal modal system K and the smallest MBK ? system are equivalent. This is motivated by the fact that the observer presented by an MBK ? system is both an ideal reasoner and an ideal observer; in other words, it is saturated with respect to the properties that we have considered (of reasoning, of observing). Analogously, K is the smallest normal system which is meant to model omniscient agents (see 9]). MBK ?
and K turn out to be not equivalent. In fact, for any set of propositional formulas ? fAg, we have ?`K A =) fBA : A 2 ?g`K BA: This property gives K a form of ideality with respect to derivations which is much stronger than the form of ideality possessed by R 0 , which is only with respect to theorems. One way to ll the gap between K and R 0 is to add to the set of axioms of the context C 0 the corresponding of the K axiom BA (B(A B) BB). Namely, for any propositional formulas A and B, , and also implemented in many applications (see, e.g., 7,17]). Intuitively, in any MBK system it is possible to (i) make assumptions in C 0 about C 1 's beliefs (e.g., assume C 0 :B(\A 1 "); : : : ; C 0 : B(\A n ")), (ii) evaluate in C 1 the consequences of these assumptions (e.g., infer by reection down C 1 : A 1 ; : : :; C 1 : A n and perform deduction in C 1 deriving C 1 :B), and (iii) re ect back the result in C 0 (e.g., infer by re ection up C 0 : B(\B") depending on C 0 :B(\A 1 "); : : :; C 0 :B(\A n ")).
Consider for instance the following deduction of (the translation of) the K As originally shown in 15], MBK can be extended to obtain MC systems equivalent to stronger normal modal logics. This can be done simply by adding further appropriate bridge rules. Technically, the idea is to keep re ection down unrestricted and use the new bridge rules to increase and control the propagation of information between C 0 and C 1 . Intuitively this shows how the idea of simulative reasoning can be extended beyond what originally described in 7]. More importantly, it provides an e ective tool for formally specifying the agents' simulative capabilities in the current implementations of multiagent systems. Consider for instance an agent a (modeled by C 0 ) which is able to export assumptions about its own beliefs in the mental image that it has of itself (modeled by C 1 ). Technically, this can be modeled via the bridge rule: C 0 :B(\A") C 1 :B(\A") 4 br :
Adding 4 br to the set of bridge rules of an MBK system, makes it possible to prove C 0 : B(\A") B(\B(\A")"), i.e., the rst order translation of the positive introspective axiom BA BBA (if a believes A, then it believes that it believes A). A proof is the following: C 0 :B(\A") C 1 :B(\A") 4 br C 0 :B(\B(\A")") R B up C 0 :B(\A") B(\B(\A")") I 0 : (2) We may also assume that a is able to export its own assumptions about what it does not believe in the mental image that it has of itself. This situation can be modeled by the following bridge rule: C 0 ::B(\A") C 1 ::B(\A") 5 br which allows to prove the corresponding of the negative introspective axiom :BA B:BA (if the a does not believe A, then it believes that it does not believe A) along the same lines as the proof (2).
Classical modal systems
Let us consider K p;q modal systems, namely systems which are K p -classical and K q -classical. Consider the smallest K p;q system. Then, Equivalent MC systems can be obtained by starting from an MBK system hfC 0 ; C 1 g; BRi (presenting the belief system hR 0 ; R 1 i B ), and by weakening the re ection principles or the deductive machinery of C 1 . In the rst case R 0 is no longer guaranteed to be an ideal observer; in the second R 1 is no longer guaranteed to be an ideal reasoner. Notice that to obtain an equivalence result we have to start from MBK and not MBK ? . Similar to what happens in Examples 14 and 15, MBK p;q and MBK 0 p;q present the same observer. However in MBK p;q the source of the (eventual) reality is in the bridge rules (modeling the reasoners' interaction capabilities), while in MBK 0 p;q is in one of the contexts (modeling the reasoners' reasoning capabilities).
Finally, it is easy to prove that MBK, as de ned in Theorem 26, and MBK 0 0;2 , as de ned in Theorem 29, are equivalent. The two systems di er only for the set of inference rules in C 1 . However, these two sets are equivalent: any inference rule in one set is a derived inference rule in the other. Given a set of formulas ?, an agent is aware of ? in a system of general awareness AW = hL AW ; T AW i, if for any formula A 2 ?, the awareness axiom 10 As before, we do not allow for nesting of modal operators.
AA belongs to T AW . If this is the case, we say that AW is an AW ? system.
To capture AW ? systems, we introduce a new predicate X corresponding to the modal operator X. The set of formulas ? of which an agent is aware determines the set of R 1 's beliefs the reasoner R 0 can explicitly observe. In other words, if A has been derived in the context C 1 , then X(\A") can be Theorem 31 Let ? be a set of propositional formulas. Let AW ? be the smallest AW ? system, and let MAW ? be the smallest MAW ? system. MAW ? and AW ? are equivalent.
Notice that in a MAW ? system there is no explicit notion of awareness in the observer language. Instead, this notion is built in the structure of the system.
Of course, analogously to what happens for modal K (and all the other modal logics), we can construct an MBK system equivalent to MAW ? simply by adding to the observer's set of axioms the (corresponding of the) awareness and explicit belief de nition axioms.
Complex belief systems
So far we have concentrated on the basic con guration of one reasoner having beliefs about another reasoner. However, we may have more complex con gurations with multiple reasoners organized in multiple belief systems possibly sharing one or both reasoners, or their belief predicate. For example, we may have an \isolated" reasoner (a reasoner which is neither being observed by another reasoner nor an observer of other reasoners) as well as a reasoner observing another reasoner which, in turn, is (possibly) observing other reasoners and so on. These arbitrary con gurations of reasoners are formally described as complex belief systems.
De nition 32 (Complex belief system) Let I be a set of indexes. Let B be a tuple of binary relations over I. Then a complex belief system is a pair hfR i g i2I ; Bi, where fR i g i2I is a family of reasoners. The k-th element of B
has an associated belief predicate B k .
The k-th binary relation in B describes all the pairs of reasoners (belief systems) whose belief predicate is B k . In the simplest case, a complex belief system consists of a set of belief systems, each two belief systems with distinct reasoners and distinct belief predicate. In this case, the cardinality n i of I is twice the cardinality n b of B. As the simplest example of this situation, the complex belief system hfR 0 ; R 1 g; hfh0; 1igii corresponds to the belief system hR 0 ; R 1 i B . n i may be also smaller than 2 n b , in which case there is at least one reasoner which is the constituent of more than one belief system. Finally, n i may be greater than 2 n b , in which case either there are isolated reasoners or there is at least one belief predicate which is shared by more than one belief system.
We use MC systems to present complex belief systems generalizing in the obvious way the notion of MR ? system and of MR ? system presenting a belief system. give notions of ideality and reality for complex belief systems and (try to) see how the results presented in Sections 2, 3, 4 can be generalized. However, as far as we know, such a characterization does not exist. We hope that our current research on the formal speci cation of multiagent systems will provide us with some ideas in this direction (see 2] for some preliminary work).
De nition 33 (MR

A comparison with modal systems { part II
We do not have any uniform way to translate MC systems presenting complex belief systems into equivalent modal systems. This does not seem possible in general, mainly because modal logics do not seem to have the modularity and exibility provided by complex belief systems. Technically, a result proved in 6] shows that there are (complex) belief systems such that it is not possible to construct an equivalent modal system with a nite schematic set of axioms. We can provide equivalence results with modal logics in the case of nested beliefs possibly in presence of multiple agents. This can be done by generalizing the equivalence theorems presented in Section 5. In our framework the situation of nested beliefs and multiple agents can be represented by a complex belief system with a tree structure like that in Figure 5 . In Figure 5 there is an external observer, represented by R , which observes n agents, each agent a i represented by a reasoner R i . This complex belief system is depicted inside the box of Figure 6 . The surrounding box represents the external observer.
Notice that introducing an external observer allows us to represent Alice and Humpty Dumpty's beliefs in a single theory. Thus, if
belongs to T this intuitively means that the external observer believes that Alice believes that the White Knight believes that the Red Queen is Asleep, or 11 The notion of external observer was rst introduced by Konolige 18] and it is used here with the same intuitive meaning. The external observer that Humpty Dumpty believes that the White Knight believes that the Red King and the Red Queen are both asleep.
For the sake of simplicity, let us concentrate on the case of a single agent a corresponding, in modal logics, to the nesting of a single modal operator. The tree structure reduces to a chain of reasoners hfR i g 0 i<n ; hfhi; i+1i j 0 i < n?1gii in which R 0 observes R 1 , R 1 observes R 2 , and so on. Assuming that this chain is nite and that the language of the bottom reasoner is propositional, we are able to model agents whose beliefs are nested up to the height of the chain.
The limit case of an in nite chain allows for the representation of agents with arbitrary level of nesting in their own beliefs. In order to generalize the equivalence results in Section 5 to the nested case, we consider MC systems corresponding to an in nite chain of reasoners. More precisely, we consider MC systems hfC i g i2! ; BRi, where BR contains for all i 2 !, a pair of bridge rules like those given in (3) (page 25) with j = i + 1. An MC system MS = hfC i g i2! ; BRi and a modal system = hL; Ti are said to be equivalent if for any formula A in L 0 , Equation (1) holds.
Notationally from now on we will write MBK, MBK p;q , MBK 0 p;q , MAW ? , K, K p;q , AW ? meaning the systems de ned in the previous sections extended to allow for arbitrary nesting (these systems will be formally de ned below).
Furthermore, if MS = hfC i g i2! ; BRi is an MC system, then MS #i is the MC system hfC i ; C i+1 g; BR #i i, where BR #i is the set of bridge rules in BR of the form C i+1 :A C i :B(\A") R B up C i :B(\A") C i+1 :A R B dn
Notice that BR #i is the set of the bridge rules given in (3) with j = i + 1.
We
De nition 36 (MBK) An MC system hfC i g i2! ; BRi is an MBK system if for each i 2 !, MBK #i satis es the conditions in De nition 25. Theorem 37 Let K be the smallest normal modal system and let MBK be the smallest MBK system. K and MBK are equivalent. Even more, consider the smallest MBK system MS such that for each i 2 !, C i :B(\A") C i+1 :B(\A") 4 i br ; or C i ::B(\A") C i+1 ::B(\A") 5 i br ; or both, belong to the set of bridge rules. Then, the positive introspective axiom or/and the negative introspective axiom become provable in any context C i (e.g., for the positive introspective axiom, substitute C i for C 0 and C i+1 for C 1 in the proof (2)). Indeed, MS turns out to be provably equivalent to the smallest normal modal system containing the positive introspective axiom, or the negative introspective axiom, or both of them; depending on the set of bridge rules that are added (see 15] for formal proofs of these facts).
The following de nition generalizes De nition 27.
De nition 38 (MBK p;q ) An MC system hfC i g i2! ; BRi is an MBK p;q system if for each i 2 !, MBK #i p;q satis es the conditions in De nition 27. Theorem 39 Let K p;q be the smallest normal modal system and let MBK p;q be the smallest MBK p;q system. K p;q and MBK p;q are equivalent. Notice that in Section 5 we have two MC systems equivalent to K p;q in the case of no nested beliefs (see De nitions 27, 28 and Theorem 29). Indeed, the above theorem only partially generalizes Theorem 29. In fact, though the MC systems in Theorem 29 present the same observer, they have di erent properties and generalize in di erent ways. From Theorem 39, MBK p;q turns out to be equivalent to K p;q . Consider instead MBK 0 p;q = hfC i g i2! ; BRi, de ned as the smallest MC system such that for each i 2 !, MBK 0 #i p;q satis es the conditions in De nition 28. MBK 0 p;q is not equivalent to K p;q . This is because a belief system with an ideal reasoner ideally observing a (possibly) real reasoner (as in De nition 28) cannot be iterated without making each observed reasoner ideal. More precisely, for each i 2 !, i has to be complete for propositional logic (since |considering MBK 0 #i p;q and De nition 28| i includes the set of Classical Natural Deduction Rules). As a consequence, MBK 0 p;q is not equivalent to K p;q unless fp;qg = f0;2g. In Appendix D we hint the proofs of the theorems in this section.
Conclusions
In this paper we have provided a taxonomic analysis of ideal and real belief. As far as we know such an analysis has never been done before. Technically the main novelties are: { Our analysis is based on a set-theoretic (instead of model-theoretic) characterization of belief and belief about belief. { Reality does not mean not ideality. Ideality characterizes the presence of certain idealized properties; reality the fact that a real reasoner (observer) computes too little or too much with respect to another reasoner (observer). { We have characterized how each constructor in an MR ? system a ects reality. { We have provided a set of equivalence results with various important modal systems. So far we have been able to produce MR ? systems equivalent to all the modal systems we know of. This work could provide a uni ed perspective of the various systems discussed in the literature.
Let C = hL; ; i be a context (presented as an axiomatic formal system). We represent an inference rule 2 as follows (0 n m): Let MS= hfC i g i2I ; BRi be an MC system (where fC i g i2I is a family of contexts and BR is a set of bridge rules). We represent a bridge rule 2 BR as follows (0 n m): This cannot be done for bridge rules (nor in the notion of deduction given below) as bridge rules (and deductions) involve formulas belonging to di erent contexts.
We now de ne what we mean by being a deduction in MS of a formula C :A depending on a set of formulas ?. 
B Proofs of the Theorems in Section 4
In this section C i is an abbreviation for C E i C I i , MS is the MC system hfC 0 ; C 1 g; BR E BR I i and hR 0 ; R 1 i B is the belief system presented by MS. { P E i is an incomplete realization of P I i ; { W E i is an incomplete realization of W I i ; { E i is an incomplete realization of I i ; { E i is an incomplete realization of I i .
We consider the case i = 0 (the case i = 1 is analogous). A n is such that i 1 = : : : = i n = 0, (the bridge rules with conclusions in C 0 have the restriction that the premise does not depend on any assumption in C 1 ). In the following, we will make extensive and tacit use of this fact.
The following lemma will be useful later.
Lemma 42 Let be either K p;q or AW ? . If A is a propositional formula and A then A is a tautology.
All the theorems in Section 5 are about the equivalence between an MC system MS = hfC 0 ; C 1 g;BRi and a modal system = hL; Ti. Proof. By induction on the structure of the proof of A.
Base case (RPL 0 ): A is a tautology (and hence also A is a tautology). Since 0 is complete for propositional logic, A is provable in C 0 .
Step case (RPL 2 ): If A is the consequence of an application of RPL 2 then the thesis follows from the induction hypothesis and the fact that 0 is complete for tautological consequence.
Step case (RK k (k 2 fp;qg)): A has the form (BA The thesis trivially follows from the induction hypothesis.
Step case ( I 0 Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of the proof of A.
Base case (RPL 0 ): A is a tautology (and hence also A y is a tautology). Since 0 is complete for propositional logic, C i :A y is provable. Step case (RPL 2 ): If A is the consequence of an application of RPL 2 , then the thesis follows from the induction hypothesis and the fact that 0 is complete for tautological consequence.
Step cases (RK k (k 2 f0;2g)): A has the form ((BA 1^: : :^BA k ) BA k+1 ). Step case (RPL 2 ): The deduction has the form (0 j m n) C Step cases ( E 0 ; I 0 ; ? 0 ): The thesis easily follows from the induction hypothesis.
Step cases (R B up ; R B dn ; R X up ; R X dn ): Let 2 fR B up ; R B dn ; R X up ; R X dn g. 
D Proofs of the Theorems in Section 7
Without loss of generality, we assume that the set of inference rules of each context C i be f E i ; I i ; ? i g (we index the name of the inference rule with the index of the corresponding context), each de ned analogously to the corresponding inference rule given at the beginning of Appendix C.
For the proof of Theorem 37 see 15].
D.1 Proof of Theorem 39
Theorem 39 Let K p;q be the smallest normal modal system and let MBK p;q be the smallest MBK p;q system. K p;q and MBK p;q are equivalent. The direction from K p;q to MBK p;q can be easily established as a consequence of the following lemma (partially generalizing Lemma 43).
Lemma 52 If`K p;q A then`M BKp;q C i :A , (i 2 !).
Proof. The proof of the above lemma is analogous to the proof of Lemma 43.
The only di erent step is when we consider an application of RK k . In this case, by induction hypothesis we have that for each j 2 ! MBKp;q C j :(A 1^: : :^A k ) A k+1 : In particular, the above equation holds for j = i+1. The thesis trivially follows from the following deduction. We generalize the notion of \strati ed deduction" given in Appendix C. We now say that a deduction is strati ed if Proof. First, we assume that each occurrence in of the conclusion of either I i or ? i depends on formulas belonging to L i . This does not cause any loss of generality because we can \move aside" deductions as in Equations D.1 and D.2 also in MAW ? . Then, the proof is analogous to the proof for the not nested case (with E i corresponding to the step RPL 2 ).
